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Reinventing Municipal Governance: 
 
Programmatic Innovations from the New Generation of Big-City Mayors 
 
John Clayton Thomas 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Introduction.  The decade of the 1990s brought to power in many American 
cities a new breed of mayors who have sought to reinvent municipal governance 
through a variety of innovations that, like the mayors themselves, defy easy 
partisan or ideological classification.  These innovations are widely viewed as 
having helped to turn around such cities as Philadelphia, Cleveland, New York, 
and Chicago.  The purpose of this paper is to explain the most notable of these 
innovations for possible consideration by Atlanta’s incoming mayor. 
 
Underlying Principles.  Underlying the various innovations are a number of 
principles to which most of these mayors have subscribed. They include: 
 
?? Hold the line on municipal taxes and spending  
?? Improve municipal service performance 
?? Introduce competition into service production and delivery 
?? Speak to the city’s pressing issues, no matter whose responsibility 
?? Help those who need help, but do for them only what they cannot do for 
themselves 
 
Acting from these principles, these mayors have undertaken a variety of 
innovations in each of the following areas: 
 
New Performance Measurement and Accountability Systems.  America’s big-
city mayors have utilized a variety of new performance measurement techniques 
with the twin goals of measuring more accurately the effectiveness of municipal 
services and establishing greater accountability for that effectiveness.  Through 
programs that vary from city to city, these mayors have sought to measure 
service effectiveness more accurately and then to reward—or, when appropriate, 
to punish—municipal departments for greater or lesser effectiveness. 
 
Marketization of Municipal Services.  In an era when privatization has become 
popular at all levels of American government, several mayors have pioneered an 
approach termed “marketization.”  Where privatization moves public services 
from government to the private sector, marketization attempts to create markets 
and competition for the delivery of public services, with services then contracted 
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to the most competitive vendors, including potentially governmental as well as 
private sector vendors.  
 
Increasing Municipal Efficiency.  As the performance measurement and 
marketization initiatives imply, these mayors have been concerned about how to 
make municipal government more efficient, that is, to decrease municipal costs 
without decreasing effectiveness.  Toward that end, they have utilized a number 
of other techniques designed to reduce governmental costs, including (1) 
Activity-Based Costing (ABC), (2) various budget innovations, and (3) special 
boards and task forces.   
 
Improving Neighborhood Quality of Life.  Programs to improve 
neighborhoods have an obvious appeal at a time when quality of life appears to 
have become even more important in residential decisions.  Prompted by a 
growing optimism about big-city neighborhoods, mayors have initiated 
programs with diverse emphases, but all designed to assist in the process of 
neighborhood development. 
 
A Mayoral Role in City Schools.  Schools arguably have more impact on a city’s 
success and quality of life than any other municipal service.  Yet, in most U.S. 
cities, including Atlanta, elementary and secondary schools are governed by a 
separate independent school district, rather than being a responsibility of City 
Hall.  Many in the new generation of big-city mayors have been unwilling to 
accept this limitation on their powers, and have sought instead to exert influence 
over decisions about schools, either by influencing school board selection or by 
bringing authority for schools under City Hall. 
 
A Mayoral Role in Regional Coordination.  Just as most mayors have no formal 
power over their cities’ schools, they also usually lack formal authority over 
regional issues.  Yet, many mayors view regionalism, much as schools, as too 
important a concern to ignore, regardless of their formal authority in the area.  
For that reason, many mayors have taken an active leadership role in attempting 
to influence either specific regional issues or regional governance more generally. 
 
Ethical and Transparent Governance.  There has been much discussion in 
Atlanta recently of a possible need for new municipal ethics policies. Atlanta’s 
new mayor should consider either (1) articulating an explicit, detailed informal 
policy on ethical and transparent governance and/or (2) creating a community 
task force to recommend new formal and informal policies in this area. 
 
Conclusion.  With different combinations of these policy innovations, America’s 
big cities entered the 21st century with a much more optimistic prognosis than 
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was the case a decade ago.  Given the success of these innovations, Atlanta’s new 
mayor would be wise to consider their potential fit for our city. 
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Reinventing Municipal Governance: 
 
Programmatic Innovations from the New Generation of Big-City Mayors 
 
John Clayton Thomas 
 
 
Introduction.  The decade of the 1990s brought to power in many of America’s 
big cities a new breed of innovative mayors, including Steven Goldsmith in 
Indianapolis, Ed Rendell in Philadelphia, Michael White in Cleveland, Jerry 
Brown in Oakland, Rudolph Giuliani in New York City, John Norquist in 
Milwaukee, Dennis Archer in Detroit, and others.  Paralleling a national trend 
toward “reinventing government,” these mayors sought to reinvent municipal 
governance through a variety of innovations that, like the mayors themselves, 
defy easy partisan or ideological classification (e.g., Beinart, 1997).  These 
innovations are widely viewed as having helped to turn around the cities where 
they were instituted.  
 
With Atlanta about to elect a new mayor, this paper is written to outline the most 
notable of these innovations for possible consideration by the incoming 
administration.  The paper will describe these innovations as they have been 
implemented in various cities, including available evidence on their effectiveness 
and on any associated risks.  The content of this paper does not imply any 
assessment of Atlanta’s needs, only of what has been done to good effect in 
other, comparable U.S. cities. 
 
Background.  America’s big cities entered the twentieth century facing a mixed 
social and economic picture.  On the one hand, cities could find hope in several 
parts of the picture: 
 
?? Their centrality for information and financial services:  Most experts 
agree that, after losing their primacy as manufacturing centers, America’s 
large cities have found a new relevance as information and financial 
centers, a welcome development after the gloomy predictions of the 
demise of the city as recently as the early 1990s. 
 
?? A fledgling back-to-the city movement:  The 2000 Census showed a 
resumption of population growth in most large cities, the first such 
growth in decades. 
 
?? A dramatically lower crime rate:  Crime, viewed by many as the biggest 
problem for America’s big cities at the outset of the 1990s, declined 
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dramatically over the course of the decade, making cities seem much 
safer. 
 
On the other hand, other parts of the picture were much less encouraging: 
 
?? A difficult economic competition:  Cities continue to compete with each 
other and with surrounding suburbs for economic investment. 
 
?? A severe vulnerability to the health of the national economy:  Just as the 
stock of big cities rose with the economic boom of the late 1990s, so it 
could fall—and perhaps more precipitously than the economy in 
general—with the current national economic slowdown. 
 
?? A problematic tax base:  Their continued primary reliance on property 
taxes poses twin difficulties for cities.  That tax base may not increase 
rapidly enough to produce substantial revenue growth; and, any increase 
in property tax rates risks further business and residential departures 
from the city. 
 
?? Troubled school systems:  Big-city school systems continue to struggle to 
an extent likely to deter back-to-the-city movement by middle- and upper-
middle-class families with school-age children. 
 
Underlying Principles.  Faced with these realities, the new generation of 
innovative mayors, whether Democratic or Republican, black or white or 
Hispanic, has followed a number of similar principles in making policy and 
programmatic choices: 
 
?? Hold the line on municipal taxes and spending:  Believing that higher 
taxes and spending would likely worsen the municipal plight, these 
innovative mayors have sought both to avoid tax increases and, in what 
has been termed “Norquist’s law” (after Milwaukee Mayor John 
Norquist), “to hold increases in city spending below the rate of inflation” 
(Norquist, 1998: 43-44). 
 
?? Improve municipal service performance:  Faced with a widespread 
perception of poor-quality municipal services, these mayors have viewed 
improving service quality as a high priority. 
 
?? Introduce competition into service production and delivery:  Persuaded 
of the value of market competition—for both reducing costs and 
improving service performance—mayors have sought to increase market 
competition in municipal services. 
  8
 
?? Speak to the city’s pressing issues, no matter whose responsibility they 
are:  Some issues important to the success of cities may lie outside the 
jurisdiction of city hall and the mayor’s office.  If these issues appear 
sufficiently important for their cities, contemporary big-city mayors have 
frequently sought to influence action on the issues. 
 
?? Help those who need help, but do for them only what they cannot do 
for themselves: These mayors have sought to follow what political 
scientist John DiIulio (Center for Civic Innovation, 1999: 110) terms the 
“subsidiarity principle”:  “In its oldest religious rendering (that of the 
Roman Catholic Church), subsidiarity is the principle according to which 
‘a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a 
community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but 
rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity 
with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common 
good.’” 
 
Acting from these principles, contemporary big-city mayors have undertaken a 
variety of innovations.  The remainder of this narrative describes the most 
notable of these. 
 
 
New Performance Measurement and Accountability Systems 
 
America’s big-city mayors over the past decade have utilized a variety of 
innovative techniques with the twin goals of measuring more accurately the 
effectiveness of municipal services and establishing greater accountability for 
that effectiveness.  Through programs that vary from city to city, these mayors 
have sought to measure service effectiveness more accurately and then to 
reward—or, when appropriate, to punish—municipal departments for greater or 
lesser effectiveness.  Examination of the different approaches suggests a number 
of possible components to efforts of this kind. 
 
Establishment of Service Outcome Effectiveness Measures.  As the essential 
first step, municipal departments are asked to define a limited number of 
measures of the effectiveness of their services—as few as one measure per 
service, but no more than five at the maximum.   Limiting each department to no 
more than a few measures forces officials to focus on their central concerns.  The 
departments themselves are asked to perform this definition because (a) they 
know their services best and (b) developing the definitions themselves should 
increase their ownership of the resulting measures. 
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It is crucial that the measures reflect service outcomes, not inputs or outputs.   
Outcomes refer to what services are designed to achieve—in a broad sense, the 
consequences of the services for society.  For a fire department, for example, 
outcome goals might include (a) minimizing fire-related fatalities and (b) 
minimizing fire-related financial losses.  Departmental administrators sometimes 
err by proposing instead measures of inputs (such as numbers of firefighters on 
the job) or outputs (numbers of fire calls responded to).  Even a conscientious 
mayor may fall into this trap, as Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith (1999: 
64) has confessed: 
 
Early in my administration, at a meeting of the city’s department 
directors, I expressed my frustration at our slow progress measuring our 
performance.  I told Mitch Roob, the director of the Department of 
Transportation, that I wanted to know exactly how many potholes his 
crews filled in a week.  “I thought you wanted to measure performance,” 
he replied.  “You shouldn’t care how many potholes my department fills.  
You should care how smooth the roads are.  How do you know we’re not 
doing such a poor job filling potholes that we have to go back out and 
redo them later?”  He was right—smooth roads are the goal; filling 
potholes is only a means to achieve the goal. 
 
To be fair, most major cities, including Atlanta, have been attempting to develop 
and track measures of municipal service effectiveness for decades.  The recent 
efforts differ from their predecessors in part through this increased emphasis on 
outcome measures.  In the past, many governments have settled for input or 
output measures instead.   That description appears to fit Atlanta, judging from a 
recent national assessment of municipal performance.  In its review of the city, 
the authors (Barrett and Greene, 2000: 46) concluded:  “Atlanta needs to use 
more outcome measures.”   
 
Outcome measures should not be limited to so-called “hard” measures, such as 
the road smoothness and fire fatality examples noted above.  With many or most 
services, outcome measures should also include indicators of citizen satisfaction 
with services and service delivery.  These indicators could include (1) records of 
citizen complaints about services and/or (2) citizen service evaluations obtained 
from periodic resident surveys.  Both provide essential perceptual measures to 
balance harder measures. 
 
Given the difficulties of defining outcome measures, the definitional effort must 
be undertaken carefully, even painstakingly, and should include a careful review 
of departmental recommendations above the departmental level in order to 
assure they qualify as outcome measures.   
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Ongoing Monitoring of Service Problems.  Once in place, the measures can be 
used first for monitoring performance in various service areas.   Many measures 
of service outcomes can be obtained with sufficient frequency to permit regular 
monitoring of service performance and service problems, often with the data 
disaggregated for different areas of cities.  Data can be developed on a monthly 
or sometimes even weekly basis, facilitating regular review and with potentially 
rapid responses to emerging problems. 
 
The best-known program along these lines is the “Compstat” program pioneered 
by New York City’s Police Department under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in the 
mid-1990s.   Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software, Compstat, 
an abbreviation for “computer statistics,” displays crime incidence information 
by areas of the city for review.  Area police captains and the department’s central 
office officials then meet on a twice-a-week basis to review the data displayed on 
a large screen.  Where crime problems appear to be emerging, area captains are 
asked—sometimes aggressively—to explain what they are doing to address the 
problems.  Captains who either do not provide adequate answers or do not 
address the problems once identified may be at risk of losing their captaincies 
(Kelling, 1995:  43).  The Compstat program is widely credited as a principal 
factor behind New York City’s dramatic reduction of crime during the 1990s. 
 
Baltimore Mayor Martin O’Malley has recently attempted to generalize this 
approach to a broad range of municipal services in a program dubbed “CitiStat” 
(Schachtel, forthcoming; Swope, 2001).  In this program eight major department 
and division heads come to one-hour meetings with the mayor and his staff 
every other week where they are asked to respond to GIS mappings of measures 
of their service performance.  As problems are identified, these administrators 
are asked to explain the problems and to suggest ways to address them.   Those 
discussions are intended then to lead to “rapid deployment of resources” and 
“effective strategies” to address problems and then “relentless follow-up and 
assessment” (Schachtel, forthcoming).  Since beginning in June 2000, CitiStat has 
supposedly produced the following accomplishments (to note just a few):   
 
?? $1.2 million in Department of Public Works savings in overtime pay. 
?? $2 million savings through fleet reductions, sale of excess city vehicles, 
and reductions in numbers of cars taken home by employees. 
?? A 25 percent reduction in active lead violations. 
?? A 51 percent increase in the number of children tested for lead. 
 
Regular meetings may not be essential for effective utilization of service 
performance data, but regular reporting is.  For example, the City of Phoenix, 
which is reputed to be one of the best-run cities in the country, provides monthly 
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service performance reports, but has in place no citywide system of meetings for 
regular review of the data (Ehrenhalt, 1995: 22). 
 
Risks?  It is difficult to find fault with any effort to develop better measures of 
municipal performance.  That said, the success of these efforts hinges on the 
ability to define good performance measures, and that ability can be impaired by 
the fact that the desired outcomes of some services are not easily measured.   As 
one critique (Walters, 1994: 34) complained, “Some governmental activity—
efforts aimed, for example, at early childhood development or economic 
development—defy precise gauging, and may be of a very long-term nature.”  
As a consequence, the absence of good data may reflect the difficulty of 
developing good performance measures. 
 
In addition, establishing the linkage between governmental activities and 
performance outcomes can be very difficult.  As one observer (Walters: 34) 
commented, “The underlying problem for measurers in many cases is that we 
don’t know the precise relationship between a governmental intervention 
strategy and what is going on in the world. . . .”   That uncertainty becomes 
problematic if municipal departments are held responsible for changes in those 
outcome measures.  A department could be punished or rewarded for changes 
over which it has little control. 
 
Such problems can be reduced by having departmental representatives propose 
the measures in the first place, as is already the practice for most innovating 
municipal governments.  Departmental representatives will ordinarily be 
sufficiently knowledgeable to avoid proposing especially problematic measures.  
The greater risk then may be that they could propose measures that will permit 
them to “cook the numbers” in their department’s favor.  That risk can be 
reduced by instituting a careful review of all proposed departmental outcome 
measures. 
 
That potential weaknesses of performance measures may also be less an 
argument against the development of performance measures than a caution about 
imputing too much meaning to the resulting data.  In reviewing data on these 
measures, municipal officials are wise to consider both the hard numbers and 
qualitative assessments not tapped by those numbers.  The regular meetings 
which are central to the Compstat and Citistat programs may be helpful in this 
regard if departmental officials focus on both qualitative and quantitative 
assessments of services, and municipal officials, including mayors, show a 
willingness to consider the qualitative assessments as well as the hard numbers. 
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Marketization of Municipal Services 
 
In an era when privatization has become popular at all levels of American 
government, several reinventing mayors have pioneered an approach termed 
“marketization.”  Where privatization moves public services from government to 
the private sector, marketization attempts to create markets and competition for 
the delivery of public services, with services then contracted to the most 
competitive vendors.   Those markets may include governmental as well as 
private sector vendors since marketization, unlike privatization, embodies no 
preference for private sector service delivery, favoring only competitive market-
driven decisions about who should deliver public services.  As former 
Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell (Center for Civic Innovation, 1999: 7) said of his 
city’s program, “The intent of our Competitive Contracting Program has never 
been to privatize city services.  Instead, we want to ensure that taxpayers receive 
the best service at the lowest cost.”  
 
The “Yellow Pages Test.”  As the starting place for a marketization effort, 
former Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith (1999: 25) suggests a “Yellow 
Pages test.”  For any service that might be a candidate for alternative service 
delivery, Goldsmith recommends looking for a section in the local Yellow Pages 
on private sector vendors in that service area.  If that search reveals even a few 
private sector vendors, Goldsmith argues that there may be a sufficient private 
sector market to seek competitive bids for future delivery of the service. 
 
At that point, a city can look toward preparing a request for proposals (RFP) for 
providing the service.  Having a strong performance measurement system in 
place can strengthen the RFP since it is then possible for the RFP to “spell out the 
precise outcomes that each city department or private vendor is expected to 
accomplish and at what cost” (Center for Civic Innovation, 1999: 5).  With those 
outcomes made explicit at the outset, the city builds into any eventual contract 
accountability for meeting the city’s goals for the service. 
 
Where a service is currently delivered by a municipal department, marketization 
can encourage that department to consider how the service can be delivered 
more economically.  That encouragement can foster innovative thinking, 
resulting in more effective as well as more economical service delivery, as the 
department attempts to compete with private sector bidders. 
 
Marketization need not be limited to services where government currently 
provides the service.  The concept can also be applied to services that have 
already been privatized, simply by opening those services to contract bids from 
other possible vendors.  The thrust of marketization is to create a competitive 
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market where a monopoly currently exists, and a private-sector monopoly is 
viewed as no better than a public-sector monopoly. 
 
In Indianapolis under Mayor Goldsmith, marketization is reported to have 
brought substantial reductions in service costs without any deterioration—and 
sometimes with improvement—in the quality of services.  As a few examples: 
 
?? A competition for the towing and disposal of abandoned vehicles was 
won by a private company, which proposed to pay the city for the right to 
dispose of unclaimed abandoned vehicles.  “Where government saw an 
expense, a private company found a profit,” and earned the city $500,000 
in the first two years of the contract (Goldsmith, 1999: 32).  
 
?? A low bid from city employees for street repairs reduced the city’s cost for 
filling potholes from $425 per ton to $307 per ton, a 25 percent savings 
(Goldsmith, 1999: 21). 
 
?? A private firm that won a competition to manage the city’s airport 
decreased landing fees from $2.49 per passenger in 1994 to $.58 in 1997 
and increased net revenue from $2.22 per passenger in 1994 to $3.14 in 
1997 (Goldsmith, 1999: 37). 
 
Similar marketization successes are reported for Giuliani’s New York, Daley’s 
Chicago, Norquist’s Milwaukee, and other mayors. 
 
Marketization can also be applied to internal service agencies (ISAs), the parts of 
local government that provide support services to the city’s direct service 
delivery agencies.  ISAs may include computer maintenance, vehicle rental and 
maintenance, and human resource management, among other functions.  In 
many cities service delivery agencies do not control the money they spend for 
ISA support, with that money instead going directly into the ISA’s budget.  In 
analyzing how such a system worked in Milwaukee, Mayor John Norquist (1998: 
34-37) “found three things wrong with our ISAs:  high cost, low quality, and 
slow service.”  After considering several options to that system, Milwaukee took 
a marketization approach, described by Norquist in these terms:  
 
our ISAs could survive on their ability, in competition with private 
vendors, to attract customer agencies.  Funding for internal services was 
shifted to the customer agencies.  They were given free rein to choose how 
to spend it.  They could continue to use the city’s ISAs, or they could buy 
the needed services on the open market.  We made the change gradually 
and trained ISA employees in basic marketplace survival skills. 
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In the early part of the experiment, ISAs consistently lost bids to private vendors.  
Over time, though, they improved their performance dramatically until, 
according to Norquist,  “After just two years, the surviving Milwaukee ISAs 
compete head-to-head and often beat out private-sector companies.” 
 
Risks?  Marketization, like privatization, risks attenuating municipal control 
over services, especially when those services are managed and delivered by 
vendors outside of city hall.  Those vendors could conceivably become focused 
on minimizing costs to the neglect of important service quality standards.  That 
risk can be greatly reduced if the RFP and the eventual contract both set clear 
performance standards against which service performance—and, eventually, 
contract renewal—will be assessed.   
 
Admittedly, those performance standards can sometimes be difficult to establish 
with services that have more subjective, hard-to-quantify outcomes.  That 
possibility may argue for caution in considering marketization of such services.  
Advocates of marketization might argue, however, that accountability is difficult 
with such services independent of whom the vendor is, whether private or 
governmental, such that marketization is still worth exploring. 
 
Marketization can also threaten the jobs of many long-time municipal employees 
if a private vendor wins the service bid and chooses to hire its own employees.  
In cities that have undertaken substantial marketization, this disadvantage has 
been minimized by (1) the extensive hiring of traditional municipal employees 
by new service vendors and (2) a combination of transfers to other departments 
and attractive early retirement packages for employees those vendors chose not 
to hire. 
 
 
Increasing Municipal Efficiency 
 
A principal goal of both better performance measurement and marketization is to 
make municipal government more efficient, that is, to decrease municipal costs 
without decreasing effectiveness.   Better performance measurement and 
marketization can both have this result.  In addition, the new generation of 
mayors has utilized a number of other techniques designed to reduce 
governmental costs, including: 
 
Activity-Based Costing (ABC).   It is typically difficult to determine the actual 
cost associated with specific municipal activities.  To attempt to address that 
problem, Indianapolis and San Diego borrowed and implemented a private-
sector accounting technique known as Activity-Based Costing (Walters, 2000).  
ABC is designed to assess all of the municipal costs associated with any given 
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activity—personnel, equipment, building space, overhead, depreciation, etc.  
Each activity can then be assessed for whether its costs are worth its benefits, 
often leading to gains in efficiency.  For example, when ABC was instituted in 
Indianapolis, a group of public works employees came to the mayor to request 
that they be freed from picking up litter on city streets.  Instead, they 
 
wanted to redirect their efforts where they could perform the best.  They 
contended that their union wages would never allow them to be 
competitive in unskilled, low-paying jobs, like picking up trash on the 
roads.  Neither could they compete in areas where the city did not have 
adequate equipment, such as the machinery necessary to erect temporary 
fencing at work sites.  But given their skills and equipment, the workers 
concluded that they could outperform anyone filling potholes and sealing 
cracks.  They proposed outsourcing litter removal and fencing in order to 
concentrate on their core business of maintaining streets (Goldsmith, 1999: 
62). 
 
Risks?   There are at least two potential problems with activity-based costing.  
First, it can be very difficult to divide municipal overhead costs so that they can 
be allocated accurately to all relevant services; and, the ABC results are only as 
good as the components of the calculation.  Second, instituting the technique 
typically requires significant up-front costs (Walters, 2000).  In Indianapolis, for 
example, a private consulting firm was contracted to train municipal employees 
to apply the technique. 
 
Budget Innovations.  The new generation of mayors have been pursued a 
number of innovations in municipal budgeting, including: 
 
Institute performance budgeting:  Performance budgeting has been 
around for years, but, if better outcome measures are in place, 
departmental budget requests can be considered more clearly in light of 
service performance.  With knowledge of what departments are 
achieving—and how those achievements have changed over time—
municipal officials are better informed about what gains are resulting 
from municipal spending in different service areas.  That knowledge may 
also prove useful in considering whether municipal spending should be 
reallocated from less effective to more effective services. 
 
Hold municipal budget increases below the rate of inflation:  As noted 
earlier, Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist has insisted on holding his city’s 
budget increases below the rate of inflation.  As part of that effort, he 
requires municipal departments to keep their annual budget within that 
limitation.  As a result, over a recent eight-year period, Norquist (1998: 44) 
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reports that the city has been to shrink its tax levy by 21.4%.  As a 
comparative standard, Milwaukee has dropped from having the third 
highest tax rate of 19 Milwaukee County municipalities when Norquist 
took office to having the 16th highest rate in 1999. 
 
Use one-time savings for infrastructure improvements:  Where one-time 
savings are achieved by whatever means, Norquist, Goldsmith, and other 
mayors have favored allocating those funds to the one-time costs of 
infrastructure improvements—roads, bridges, and the like.  That approach 
both improves infrastructure and avoids the temptation to use one-time 
savings for ongoing budgetary needs. 
 
Risks?  The innovations have found few detractors.  The principal risks may be 
the cost of the time spent in making the various efforts. 
 
Special Boards and Task Forces.  Many cities have created new advisory bodies 
to assist in their efforts to reduce municipal costs.  Two specific forms are worth 
noting: 
 
Business task forces on municipal efficiency:  Many contemporary 
mayors have created task forces of business leaders to examine municipal 
spending.  Two examples are the Financial Research and Advisory 
Committee, created by Mayor Richard Daley for Chicago (Mahtesian, 
1994), and the Mayor’s Private Sector Task Force on Management and 
Productivity, initiated by Ed Rendell for Philadelphia.  In the latter case, 
the Task Force involved the heads of 41 local corporations and 
approximately 300 loaned executives, who produced 17 reports on 26 city 
departments and 7 citywide issues in its first year of existence (Center for 
Civic Innovation, 1999: 10).  In Los Angeles, at the initiative of Mayor 
Richard Riordan, another business task force supposedly identified more 
than $1 billion in savings for the city over a five-year period (“Good Odds 
for a Gambling Man,” 1994). 
 
Regulation review boards:  Governmental regulations potentially create 
costs that do not appear in their budgets, but that still impose substantial 
costs on city residents and businesses.  Concerned about these costs, 
Indianapolis under Stephen Goldsmith (1999: 86-89) created a Regulatory 
Study Commission to review existing and proposed regulations to 
determine if they are worth their cost.  The commission reviews 
regulations, then forwards a recommendation to the governing City-
County Council.   
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Risks?  While not a disadvantage as such, there are almost no data on how 
effective either of these techniques has been, with only anecdotal evidence of 
their success.  As one possible risk, since both types of boards might appear to tilt 
toward private businesses, their use might open a mayor to complaints of bias in 
favor of those businesses.  That risk might be minimized if public sector 
representatives and citizens without strong business ties were also appointed to 
these bodies. 
 
 
Improving Neighborhood Quality of Life 
 
Programs to improve neighborhoods have an obvious appeal at a time when 
quality of life appears to have become even more important in residential 
decisions.  If cities are to thrive, they may need to attract and retain more 
residents, especially middle- and upper-middle-class residents.  The likelihood of 
attracting those residents may be higher now than it has been in decades, judging 
from a variety of trends:  
 
?? A sense of a greater control over crime, which has been arguably 
the single most important factor in undermining the quality of life 
in central-city neighborhoods in recent decades. 
 
?? The beginnings of economic revival in many of these 
neighborhoods, likely sparked by a combination of the national 
economic boom of the 1990s and of the efforts by neighborhoods 
themselves. 
 
?? The embryonic back-to-the-city movement that appears to be 
bringing more of the middle and upper-middle classes to homes in 
cities. 
 
?? New land-use controls, imposed in an effort to limit further urban 
sprawl, that may, as in the Atlanta area, add to the attractiveness of 
living in central city neighborhoods.  
 
For these and other reasons, in many of America’s big cities as well as in a 
growing scholarly literature (for example, Grogan and Proscio, 2000), there is 
increased optimism about the potential for improving big city neighborhoods, as 
through new municipal programs directed at neighborhoods. 
 
Neighborhoods in Broader Perspective.  Before examining specific 
neighborhood-focused programs, however, it is important to consider what 
changes make for better neighborhoods and how a mayor can influence those 
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changes.  To begin with, almost any effective municipal initiative can contribute 
to a higher quality of life in neighborhoods.  Citywide crime-reduction efforts, as 
already suggested, have paid large dividends for neighborhoods in many cities 
by making life there safer for residents.  High-quality schools, as discussed 
below, are also essential if neighborhoods are to attract anyone other than empty 
nesters, young childless professionals, and the poor.  In fact, one school of 
thought holds that a focus on these service areas may be the best way to help the 
urban poor.  In the words of scholar Terry Clark (2000: 15): 
 
the argument is made that government can help the poor best by helping 
all cities, not by targeting the poor.  This has led to a focus on the public 
goods (widely shared by city residents) of improving schools and 
reducing crime, trends found in many large cities. 
 
Atlanta’s new mayor would consequently be wise not to lose sight of these 
important issues of crime reduction and school improvement. 
 
Second, an extensive scholarly literature clearly implies that only a multifaceted 
approach, involving a variety of actors, can turn around declining 
neighborhoods.  The actors who must be involved include corporate and 
institutional actors (“banks, universities, insurance companies, or manufacturing 
firms”), strong neighborhood organizations, and government (Taub, Taylor, and 
Dunham, 1984: 182-184).   As that assessment suggests, municipal government 
must play a role but not the only role.  Nor can private markets on their own 
solve neighborhood problems either, although they also must play a role.  Even a 
conservative such as Stephen Goldsmith (1999: 152), the former Indianapolis 
mayor, explicitly concedes this point: 
 
People who share my free market philosophy may find it difficult to 
accept that no matter how much we want to withdraw government from 
the marketplace, we cannot do it immediately.  Poor communities have 
suffered so much from catastrophic government policies over the past 
thirty years that government is needed to undo the harm. 
 
A Mayoral Leadership Role.   Recognizing that a mayor is only one actor among 
many on issues of neighborhood improvement, a mayor who is concerned about 
neighborhoods might seek first to assume a leadership role among the various 
actors.  In that role the mayor could attempt to persuade the various actors to 
coordinate their efforts toward neighborhood improvement.  Those efforts at 
persuasion might include, for example, encouraging the city’s financial 
institutions to become more involved with neighborhoods.  As well, as the leader 
of City Hall, the mayor could work to see that its resources are also committed to 
these efforts. 
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The efforts of Cleveland Mayor Michael White illustrate how this might be done.  
Concerned to increase the city’s housing stock in both neighborhoods and 
downtown, White applied pressure on the city’s financial institutions to increase 
their loans to low-income buyers, using as leverage the federal Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1970, which encourages financial institutions to help meet 
their communities’ needs.   White also made certain that City Hall did its part 
through generous use of a revolving loan for housing development.  His efforts 
along these lines resulted in the building of approximately 2500 new homes, as 
compared to only 200 in the prior decade (Bier, 2001).   
 
Beyond assuming this general leadership role, contemporary big-city mayors 
have initiated a variety of neighborhood-focused programs with diverse 
emphases, but all designed to assist in the process of neighborhood 
development.  Most of these programs begin with the premise that governments 
must be careful in how they attempt to assist neighborhoods in order to avoid 
what are widely perceived to be the paternalistic, heavily bureaucratic, and 
largely ineffective programs of the past.  For many observers, the goals should 
be, consistent with DiIulio’s “subsidiarity principle,” (1) to help neighborhoods 
that are attempting to improve themselves, but (2) to provide that help only 
where neighborhoods cannot do the necessary work entirely on their own.   
 
Regulatory Programs.  Two regulatory programmatic initiatives provide 
examples of how this principle can be put into operation: 
 
?? Milwaukee’s Drug Abatement Program (DAB):  A combined 
effort of the city’s building inspectors, police, and neighborhoods, 
this program encourages landlords to evict suspected drug sellers.  
Although police may investigate and arrest these suspects, “the 
idea is to confront and remove drug dealing right away, even if 
this means passing up the opportunity to stage a big drug raid. 
Why?  Because people, especially children, who live near the 
suspected drug house need quick relief from the threat to their 
lives and property” (Norquist, 1998: 119).  According to 
Milwaukee Mayor Norquist, police find in 85% of the DAB cases 
that there is no further drug activity at those locations for at least 
sixty days. 
 
?? Collaborative code enforcement with low-income landlords:  
Many cases where municipal building codes are violated involve 
low-income landlords who may feel unable to afford the necessary 
improvements.  One scholar (Center for Civic Innovation, 1999: 84) 
recommends a collaborative approach, similar to what has recently 
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been used with success in some national regulatory efforts, where 
code enforcement personnel work with these landlords to, where 
possible, find affordable solutions to those problems. 
 
In both programs, government does not attempt to achieve outcomes on its own, 
but instead works collaboratively with neighborhoods and residents to attempt 
to achieve those outcomes together. 
 
New Spending Programs.   Many mayors and other urban experts believe that 
new financial resources must also be infused in order for many neighborhoods to 
improve.  These mayors and their initiatives include (Ehrenhalt, 2001): 
 
?? Boston Mayor Tom Menino’s Main Street program, which has 
given $300,000 to each of 19 neighborhoods to improve their 
commercial districts. 
 
?? Baltimore Mayor Tom O’Malley’s Mayor’s Office of 
Neighborhoods that will target extensive funding to twelve 
neighborhood commercial districts each year. 
 
?? Philadelphia Mayor John Street’s bond program to raze or 
rehabilitate the city’s abandoned structures and to take control of 
abandoned vacant lots. 
 
Menino’s Main Street Program builds from his premise that “retail commerce is 
the key to neighborhood success” (Ehrenhalt, 2001: 33).  Each neighborhood 
receives funds, mostly from Community Development Block Grant funding, for 
what is described as “the mundane work of façade and design improvements, 
promotional activity and merchant recruitment” (Ehrenhalt, 2001: 34). 
 
Evidence on the effectiveness of Menino’s program is limited to anecdotal 
reports from a number of the neighborhoods.  For example, one neighborhood, 
after languishing despite substantial federal and local funding during the 1970s 
and the 1980s, now appears, with the assistance of the Main Street Program, to be 
turning around, judging from the recent opening of its first retail unit, a large 
drug store, and the anticipated opening in the near future of a new super market. 
 
Having taken office only this year, Philadelphia Mayor Street’s program is newer 
and even less amenable to evaluation.  Street proposes an initial $250 million 
bond issue—which would eventually total five times that amount—to seal up or 
rehabilitate the city’s 25,000 abandoned structures and to reclaim 31,000 
abandoned empty lots.  He acknowledges, though, that the proposal must 
become the city’s, not just his, if it is to succeed. 
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Risks?  These latter programs pose at least two risks.  First, any program that 
involves direct spending in neighborhoods brings a risk that the money may not 
be well spent.  If neighborhoods are allowed to choose, there is no guarantee that 
they will make good choices about how to spend the money, but, if they are not 
allowed to choose, neighborhoods may not provide the other support necessary 
for that spending to be effective.  Thus, it does no good to tear down an 
abandoned building if additional buildings are soon abandoned in the same 
neighborhood.  Money will be well spent in neighborhoods only if it is combined 
with other resources, both financial and human, and from both the 
neighborhoods and the business sector.  Determining in advance whether those 
other resources will materialize can be difficult, perhaps especially with the 
commitment of residents that is crucial to rebuilding neighborhoods. 
 
Second, neighborhood improvements can encourage gentrification, which can in 
turn threaten long-term, low-income neighborhood residents.  If a neighborhood 
improves and property values escalate, those residents may eventually face 
increased property taxes that exceed their ability to pay.  Cities must be sensitive 
to this issue as they pursue neighborhood improvement. 
 
Third, but perhaps most important, planning for any program for neighborhoods 
must include extensive involvement of the neighborhood residents themselves.  
Where that has not been the case, programs have quickly foundered in the face of 
angry opposition from neighborhood residents.  In Seattle, for example, former 
Mayor Norm Rice’s seemingly progressive plan for combating urban sprawl ran 
into adamant neighborhood opposition when, under the pressure of a time 
constraint, the city reduced neighborhood involvement in drafting the plan 
(Gurwitt, 1994). 
 
 
A Mayoral Role in City Schools? 
 
Schools arguably have more impact on a city’s success and quality of life than 
any other municipal service.  Prospective residents, if they have children, 
probably ask more questions about a city’s schools than about any other service, 
hoping to ensure that where they choose to live will offer high-quality education 
for their children.  Schools also take a large chunk of the property tax dollar, a 
larger chunk than any other municipal service.  In Indianapolis, for example, 
approximately 44 percent of every property tax dollar goes to schools, with 21 
percent going to fund the city’s police and fire departments and 9 percent to fund 
all other city functions (Goldsmith, 1999: 112).  Thus, any effort to control 
residential or business property taxes in a city is dependent on having control 
over taxes for schools. 
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Yet, in most U.S. cities, elementary and secondary schools are governed by a 
separate independent school district, rather than being a responsibility of City 
Hall.  As a consequence, most mayors have no formal control over either the 
quality of schools in their cities or the tax burden imposed to fund schools.  The 
service that could have the greatest bearing on a city’s fate is outside the formal 
control of the mayor and of anyone else in City Hall. 
 
Many in the new generation of big-city mayors have been unwilling to accept 
this limitation on their powers, and have sought instead to exert influence over 
decisions about schools.  Although Atlanta’s schools appear to be improving, the 
city’s new mayor may still want to consider some kind of effort toward more 
collaboration or coordination between city hall and the school district.  The 
choices of other recent mayors suggest at least these options: 
 
?? Endorsing a slate of school board candidates:  Arguing that schools 
required more concerted attention, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan 
during his second term recruited and endorsed his own slate of 
candidates for school district seats.  Riordan presumably reasoned that 
school board members who agreed with his priorities would be more 
likely, once elected, to work cooperatively with the mayor’s office.  
Riordan’s endorsements were initially influential, as three members of his 
slate were elected to the board.  In the next school board election two 
years later, however, only one Riordan-endorsed candidate was elected 
after teacher unions mounted an extensive campaign against Riordan’s 
slate.  No data are available to assess the effects of Riordan’s slate being 
elected to the school board. 
 
?? Obtaining the authority to appoint some members of the School Board:  
Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown successfully sought an even more direct 
means to influence the Oakland school board.  He was able to change 
Oakland’s charter to give the mayor authority to appoint three members 
of the city’s School Board (Gurwitt, 2000).  Brown gained this authority 
too recently for any evidence to be available yet on his ability to leverage 
this new authority toward better schools. 
 
?? Bringing the school district under city hall control:  In a few cities, such 
as New York, elementary and secondary schools have long been 
municipal responsibilities.  In two cities where schools were not under 
city hall control, Cleveland Mayor Michael White and Chicago Mayor 
Richard J. Daley were successful in persuading their state legislatures to 
transfer authority for their cities’ schools from an independent district to 
city hall.  Both mayors seized on that new authority to make major 
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changes in how the schools were run.  Daley’s efforts are perhaps the best 
documented, with its finances in better shape—resulting in the system 
receiving its first investment grade bond rating since 1979—and student 
math and reading scores on the increase (Ward, 1997).  Cleveland’s 
schools are also widely perceived to have improved, largely as a 
consequence of the work of Mayor White’s handpicked choice for 
superintendent. 
 
These mayors have sought more control over schools in order to pursue an 
agenda that is similar from one city to another.  First, they seek more control over 
school finances, both taxes and spending, usually with an eye to reducing or 
holding the line on both.   Second, they frequently seek more control over the 
educational bureaucracy, often working to reduce its size.  In New York City, for 
example, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani used his authority earlier this year to 
persuade the city’s superintendent of schools to downsize the school district’s 
central administration by 1,500 employees (Wyatt, 2001).  Third, these mayors 
commonly seek to offer parents more choice among schools.  Some mayors, such 
as Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist and Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith, 
favor vouchers, though usually not financed by local funds.  Others, such as 
Chicago’s Daley, have favored the development of charter schools, where 
specific schools are given a charter to pursue a particular emphasis while at the 
same time freed from many traditional bureaucratic constraints. 
 
To the extent they succeed in these efforts, mayors reduce some of the oft-
criticized fragmentation of authority in metropolitan areas.  In the process they 
may gain more authority over school finances, giving them more ability to 
control the tax burden on residents and businesses.  They may also gain more 
ability to change school programming in ways that may lead to better student 
achievement.  Either of the latter two achievements could by itself warrant 
making the effort.   
 
Risks?  Efforts of this kind carry substantial risks, perhaps especially political 
risks.  First, a mayor may risk a political backlash if the public views the mayor 
as “power-hungry.”  Such an accusation has not appeared to inflict serious 
political damage on any of the mayors who undertook the initiatives described 
above, however.  Second, efforts of this kind may require the expenditure of 
substantial political capital by the mayor, yet without any assurance of success.  
More than with most other innovations by the reinventing mayors, gaining 
authority over schools requires reaching beyond the mayor’s usual power—to 
obtain voter support for a candidate slate or, even more problematic, to obtain 
state legislative support for state action.  The success of these efforts is not 
guaranteed, and, if they fail, the mayor will have lost time, political capital, and 
perhaps voter confidence in the mayor’s ability to make things happen. 
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A Mayoral Role in Regional Coordination? 
 
Much as most mayors have no formal power over their cities’ schools, so they 
also usually lack formal authority over regional issues.  Yet, many mayors view 
regionalism, much as they view schools, as too important a concern to ignore, 
regardless of their formal authority in the area. 
 
What we know about metropolitan regions in the U.S. suggests several reasons 
why mayors might choose to become involved in regional issues that extend 
beyond their cities’ boundaries: 
 
?? The fates of cities and their suburbs appear to be inextricably 
intertwined.  A body of recent scholarly research suggests that, in 
any given U.S. metropolitan area, how well the central city does 
economically is linked to how well its suburbs do economically (for 
a summary, see Gurwitt, 1992).  The success of the central city does 
not necessarily determine the success of its suburbs or vice versa, 
but how well each does appears to contribute to how well the other 
does. 
 
?? Metropolitan regions probably compete more with each other for 
economic development than do different municipalities within the 
same metropolitan area.  As a consequence, the various 
municipalities within any given metropolitan area are well advised 
to cooperate with each other, competing, if at all, only with 
municipalities from other regions. 
 
?? Increasingly, the issues that face central-city mayors are regional 
rather than local in focus.  For example, issues of air quality and of 
water quality and supply, all of which have become more salient 
for America’s urban areas in recent years, often cannot be 
addressed except from a regional perspective. 
 
Although those factors suggest the need for more regional cooperation, they do 
not necessarily imply that the central-city mayor—Atlanta’s new mayor in this 
case—should take the lead in pursuing that cooperation.  That possibility is 
suggested by two other factors: 
 
?? The mayor of the central city is the titular leader of the city by 
which the region is best known, providing some basis for claiming 
a spokesperson role for the area. 
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?? By virtue of salary, legal authority, and city size, Atlanta’s mayor is 
one of only a few mayors in the metropolitan area who is expected 
to work full time as mayor.  That fulltime expectation gives 
Atlanta’s mayor more time to pursue a variety of issues. 
 
The efforts of other recent big-city mayors offer at least two models of how a 
mayor can push regional issues.  First, recognizing the counter-productive 
potential of competition between cities and their suburbs for economic 
development, the mayor might push for the city and its suburbs to agree not to 
compete with each other for economic development.  Both Detroit Mayor Dennis 
Archer and former Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith have pursued these 
kinds of agreements with some success.  Archer has been described as “a tireless 
ambassador to the suburbs ringing Detroit, pressing the case for regional 
cooperation and working to repair frayed relations at town meetings, at Rotary 
Clubs, and through a coalition of nearly 50 regional CEOs.” 
 
In the Indianapolis case Goldsmith “decided to try negotiating a peace treaty” 
with suburbs to end their economic competition with each other.  He worked to 
convene a group of elected officials from surrounding areas to discuss regional 
issues.  Regional business leaders were also persuaded to form the Metropolitan 
Association of Greater Indianapolis Communities to provide additional impetus 
toward cooperation.  Discussions also emphasized the findings, as reported 
above, that, “although urban losses sometimes create short-term suburban gain, 
they almost invariably hurt suburbs in the long term” (Goldsmith, 1999: 84-85). 
 
The effort was not entirely successful, but did result in what Goldsmith describes 
as a “bilateral treaty” with the “most prosperous” neighboring county, providing 
for: 
 
?? Shared infrastructure investment, 
?? Regional transportation and sewer planning, 
?? Shared strategies for targeting key industries, and 
?? No economic cannibalization. 
 
A somewhat different approach is suggested by the efforts of a group of inner-
ring suburbs in the Cleveland, Ohio, area.  Calling themselves “The First Suburbs 
Consortium,” these suburbs have united to pursue a number of common needs, 
again principally—but not exclusively—related to economic development 
(Gurwitt, 1998).  Alone among the proposals described here, this collaboration 
has not involved the area’s central city, as Cleveland has neither joined the group 
nor its discussions. 
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Yet, Cleveland clearly shares some interests with these suburbs.  Those shared 
interests may be increasing as the agenda of the First Suburbs Consortium turns 
increasingly to questions about suburban sprawl.  Several of the consortium’s 
leaders reportedly “believe central cities and older suburbs are unfairly 
burdened by policies at every level that steer resources to new development 
rather than redevelopment, with congestion and rising taxes the ultimate result” 
(Gurwitt, 1998: 17) 
 
Atlanta’s interests may well be similar or identical since the city likely would 
benefit from more emphasis on redevelopment as opposed to new development.  
Moreover, the Atlanta area is already seeing policy movement in this direction, 
as, most notably, through the regulatory efforts of the Georgia Regional 
Transportation Authority.  Atlanta’s new mayor might consequently consider if 
and how to attempt to take a leadership role on regional issues. 
 
There are at least two potential gains from any mayoral regional involvement.  
First, any competition between Atlanta and its suburbs could be discouraged, 
minimizing costly competition between city and suburbs.  Second, Atlanta’s 
mayor might be able to influence regional initiatives in directions more favorable 
to the city’s future. 
 
Risks?  The risks are similar to the risks of mayoral involvement with city 
schools.  First, the mayor could be perceived as over-stepping his or her 
authority.  Such a risk could be greater now in Atlanta since other bodies—
GRTA in particular—have recently received grants of regional authority that 
they are only beginning to exercise.  These other regional initiatives also mean, as 
another potential disadvantage to regional involvement, that the marginal 
contribution Atlanta’s mayor can make may not be as great as in other cities 
without similar regional authorities.  Finally, attempting to ally with inner-ring 
suburbs carries the risk of making enemies of outer-ring suburbs.   
 
These risks may not be as great as they could appear, judging from the apparent 
lack of complaints about those mayors who have asserted themselves on regional 
issues.  Still, the potential disadvantages of regional involvement probably 
counsel that any such efforts should be pursued cautiously and with finesse. 
 
 
Ethical and Transparent Governance 
 
There has been much discussion in Atlanta recently of a possible need for new 
municipal ethics policies.  Unfortunately, the experience of other cities does not 
suggest good innovative models for such policies.  San Diego, for example, is 
currently attempting to implement a new ethics policy, but with much 
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frustration and little apparent effectiveness.  As well, stringent ethics policies can 
frequently prove counter-productive.  According to Alan Rosenthal, an expert on 
state-level ethics policies:  “What we’re doing by overlegislating ethics is trying 
to get the bad guys.  But we’re never going to get the bad guys, because they are 
very good at being bad.  What we succeed in doing is making life increasingly 
miserable and fraught with danger for the good guys” (as quoted in Mahtesian, 
1999: 39). 
 
An Informal Ethics Policy.  An alternative model might be an informal, but 
explicit, policy of transparent and ethical governance.  Rather than creating new 
ordinances or changing the city’s Board of Ethics to improve monitoring and 
enforcement of ethical standards, a mayor might instead publicly announce a set 
of principles that the new administration will follow.  Those principles might 
begin, borrowing language from the Code of Ethics of the International City-
County Management Association (ICMA, 2000), with members of the new 
administration committing:   
 
?? “To conduct themselves so as to maintain public confidence in their . . . 
local government and in their performance of their official duties,” and 
?? “To conduct their official and personal affairs in such a manner as to give 
the clear impression that they cannot be improperly influenced in the 
performance of their duties.”  
 
Such an informal policy should also include a number of more specific 
principles, such as: 
 
?? Full and rapid disclosure of all amounts and sources of campaign funds. 
?? Open, competitive bidding for all possible contracts with the city. 
?? Well-publicized, open public meetings on all major policy proposals, 
including all significant contracts. 
?? Full disclosure by the mayor and all city council members of all 
relationships with potential city contractors and abstention from all votes 
where there is an actual or potential conflict of interest. 
?? Complete confidentiality on all confidential information obtained in the 
course of one’s official duties. 
 
Any policy on ethical and transparent governance should also attempt to address 
how to build a more constructive relationship with the mass media.  Media 
relations have proved a common problem for contemporary mayors, with 
Cleveland’s Michael White, Chicago’s Richard M. Daley, and Philadelphia’s John 
Street, among others, all engaging in heated and protracted battles with local 
media, especially newspapers.  Some conflict is unavoidable given the media’s 
traditional role of watchdog over government, but that conflict might be reduced 
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if mayors committed to open and transparent government, which would entail at 
least two components: 
 
?? Regular conversations with the press, including both reporters and 
newspaper editorial boards, on issues facing the city. 
?? Prompt responses to media requests for public records. 
 
Improving relationships with the media can also nurture the perception among 
the broader public of an open government, a perception that may be equally as 
important as the reality of open government.   Mayor Ed Rendell’s early success 
in Philadelphia, for example, was credited in part to his ability “to create the 
common perception of a government that is open, accessible and willing to 
listen” (Mahtesian, 1993: 36). 
 
A Task Force.   An informal policy might not be sufficient if ethical issues in 
Atlanta have already too severely undermined public confidence.  In that case 
another option is to create a community-based ethics task force to make 
recommendations on possible new ethics policies, both formal and informal.  
Such a task force would be designed to serve the dual functions of (1) 
recommending new policies to improve the ethical climate in City Hall while at 
the same time (2) attempting to re-build community confidence in City Hall.  
 
Clark County, Nevada, which includes the city of Las Vegas, provides a recent 
model of how such a task force might work (Walton, 2001; Packer, 1999).  The 
county has faced repeated ethical questions about County Commissioner 
involvement in airport contracts, which fall under the county’s authority, 
questions not dissimilar to those raised recently in Atlanta.  With the support of 
some Commission members, the County Manager—an appointed rather than 
elected position—in 1998 established a Clark County Ethics Task Force to set 
ethical guidelines for the County Commission.  In an effort to get broad 
community representation, the eleven-member task force included educators, 
religious leaders, media representatives, former elected officials, and some 
current Commission members.  The task force eventually produced a number of 
recommendations, including:  (1) all contract bids should be reviewed and 
ranked prior to and without the involvement of the County Commissioners; (2) 
an independent citizens’ review board might be created to review and rank some 
airport contract bids; and (3) applicants for contracts are prohibited from any 
lobbying of commissioners, or any other contact with commissioners, until the 
finalists are forwarded to the Commission for approval, with any violation 
disqualifying the applicant.   
 
A task force of this kind can have a number of advantages.  As the most obvious, 
the task force could produce valuable recommendations for changes in ethics 
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policies and procedures.  As well, by involving religious leaders, educators, and 
media representatives as well as elected officials, the task force has the potential 
for building high credibility for its recommendations in the community.  That 
credibility can be further enhanced if the task force chooses to hold public 
meetings, both early on to seek ideas and later to test possible recommendations.  
A mayor who then follows those recommendations should gain credibility by 
association, while at the same time presumably improving the city’s ethical 
standards.   
 
In the Atlanta case, the body might be cast more broadly as a Task Force on 
Ethical and Transparent Government, with the intent of addressing both ethical 
questions and related issues around governmental openness.  The latter issues 
are likely to arise naturally anyway based on the interests of media 
representatives and of the broader public during public meetings. 
 
Any such task force should be time limited, charged to produce its 
recommendations within perhaps six months’ time or in any event no more than 
a year’s time.  Its members might be appointed by the mayor, but with 
community and council involvement in order to build broad ownership and 
legitimacy for the task force. 
 
Risks?  These two possible approaches bring different kinds of risks.  On the one 
hand, having only an informal policy risks giving too little attention to the issue.  
Citizens might view an informal policy as nothing more than lip service where 
broader action may be needed.  Creating a task force, on the other hand, carries a 
risk of overkill if the task force, in taking its charge seriously, produces policy 
recommendations that “overlegislate,” possibly constraining the “good guys” 
without stopping the “bad guys.”  This risk might be mitigated by the mayor’s 
office, as is entirely appropriate, having representatives on the task force who 
have been sensitized in advance to the risks of policy overkill.  In the end, 
though, the mayor—and the council—would still need to treat seriously the task 
force recommendations or risk being perceived as not serious about ethics. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decade of the 1990s brought to power in many of America’s big cities a new 
breed of innovative mayors who have sought to reinvent municipal governance 
through a variety of policy and program innovations.  These innovations, like the 
mayors themselves, defy easy partisan or ideological classification, but 
collectively, in different combinations in different cities, the innovations are 
widely viewed as having helped to turn around the cities where they were 
instituted.  In part due to these mayors and their innovative policies, America’s 
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big cities entered the 21st century with a much more optimistic prognosis than 
was the case only a decade ago.   
 
Upon taking office, Atlanta’s new mayor is likely to face a “honeymoon” period 
of high receptivity to mayoral policy initiatives.  Although it is not clear at first 
glance which of these policies from other cities might work well in Atlanta, it is 
clear that, given the success of these innovations elsewhere, Atlanta’s new mayor 
would be wise to consider their potential fit here and to pursue the most 
attractive of the innovations during the anticipated honeymoon period.   
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